Since Hamas’ brutal attack against Israel on October 7th and Israel’s heavy-handed response to it during the last six months, regional tensions between Israel and Iran have intensified. These tensions culminated in the Israeli assassination of high-ranking Iranian military personnel in Damascus on April 1st. While such operations had been conducted by Israel in the past, this one was unique in that it involved death and destruction at the Iranian consulate, which is an extension of sovereign territory. As such, it constituted a violation of international laws and norms surrounding the so-called rules-based order.
Nearly two weeks later, on April 13th, Iran retaliated by launching three hundred combat and suicide drones and ballistic and cruise missiles at Israel. Like the Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate, the Iranian drone and missile attack was unprecedented. It was the Islamic Republic’s first direct attack against Israel in its history. Until then and excluding cyberwarfare, Iran had exclusively initiated indirect attacks against Israel through partners and proxies. While the attack was unprecedented and expansive, it was also choreographed and telegraphed in terms of the official statements, military maneuvers, and intelligence sharing that had preceded it. It contrasted with Iran’s undetected drone and missile strike on Saudi oil facilities in 2019.
Consequently, Israel and its allies and partners, including the United States and several Arab countries, were able to anticipate and intercept the incoming Iranian drones and missiles before they even entered Israeli airspace. Though some evaded Israel’s air defenses and penetrated its territory, they reportedly inflicted minor damage on its military bases and civilian population. After the attack, the Iranians stated that the matter was concluded, meaning they did not intend to launch additional attacks against Israel, at least directly. In January 2020, and after the US drone assassination of Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani, the Iranians had issued the same statement following their retaliatory missile strike against US troops, who were housed at al-Asad Airbase in Iraq, to avoid further escalation with the United States.
After the Iranian drone and missile attack and Israeli statements vowing to respond to it, American and European officials at the G7 summit sought to de-escalate tensions between both sides. These officials condemned the attack, without doing the same to the Israeli one on the Iranian consulate. They also imposed additional sanctions against individuals and entities affiliated with Iran’s drone and missile programs, even if previous sanctions had done little, if anything, to contain these programs. Finally, these officials pressured Israel to respond in a proportionate and measured manner during visits to Tel Aviv by the British and German foreign ministers.
Less than a week later, on April 19th, Israel responded by launching a missile strike against Iran’s military facilities outside of Isfahan. These facilities purportedly contained a nuclear site and drone and missile factories, along with S-300 surface-to-air missiles and other air defense systems that Iran had recently acquired from Russia. While the extent of the damage was still being assessed, the strike was not unprecedented and resembled other sabotage operations the Israelis had conducted against such facilities as recently as 2022-23. The next day, on April 20th, the Iranian foreign minister stated that Iran would not respond to the Israeli attack, ending the cycle of escalation for the moment.
The tit-for-tat exchange that transpired between Israel and Iran during the month of April was a source of concern with respect to regional escalation. It crossed red lines and created a new normal, with Israel unabashedly striking an Iranian consulate and Iran directly attacking Israeli territory. That said, there was guarded optimism that the exchange would not embroil both sides or the wider region in a full-blown conflagration, even if there always existed the possibility of miscalculation and the disparity between intentionality and outcome. In addition to being choreographed and telegraphed, the Iranian and Israeli responses exclusively targeted military sites rather than civilian population centers. They were carried out with restraint and designed to de-escalate tensions so both sides could walk back from the brink of full-scale warfare. Strategically, Israel was reluctant to open yet another front in a protracted conflict on borders all around it. Simultaneously, Iran sought to reverse course so it could continue to maintain an asymmetrical advantage and avoid directly engaging with conventionally superior adversaries in Israel and the United States.
The Iranian and Israeli responses also possessed symbolic value by delivering messages of deterrence designed to dissuade the enemy from further exceeding intolerable thresholds, such as striking a diplomatic compound, and to signal suboptimal scenarios for the other side to contemplate. They included swarm attacks of Iranian drones and missiles of the type deployed by Russia and witnessed in Ukraine that could elude Israeli air defenses and hit military and civilian infrastructure, as well as Israeli missile strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and military facilities, among other targets. For Israel and Iran, and within the framework of the security dilemma, the issue with establishing deterrence in this fashion was that it would likely invite an expansion of military capabilities and lead to higher stakes conflict in the future. What was needed for the region was a security architecture for actors like Israel and Iran to communicate more clearly and delineate red lines before tensions erupted and escalated to the point of a full-blown conflict.
Beyond being designed to disseminate messages to each other, the tit-for-tat exchange between Israel and Iran was intended to send signals to external and internal constituencies. Externally, Israel acted with restraint to appease its European and especially American allies and partners. On April 13th, the United States had downed Iranian drones and missiles. During the days leading up to the Israeli missile strike on April 19th, Washington had vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on Palestinian statehood and refrained from sanctioning Israeli military units accused of murder and rape.
Irrespective of its support for Israel and in the wake of the Iranian attack, the Biden administration had pressured Tel Aviv to exercise caution and prevent escalation. The latter was something the administration could ill afford heading into election season, with voter sentiments souring and oil prices rising as the war in Gaza continued. With the military debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq, the administration aspired to prevent Israel from dragging the United States into another costly conflict in the region. On the other side, Iran’s unprecedented attack was meant to show its regional proxies that their patron was not afraid to stand up to the little and great Satans (i.e., Israel and the United States). In the process, the Islamic Republic desired to dispel the doubts of its partners concerning its commitment to fight for the Palestinians against the so-called arrogant powers that were responsible for their death and displacement before and after October 7th.
Finally, the tit-for-tat exchange was intended for domestic consumption by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as they found themselves in precarious political positions. Inside their respective governments, both leaders attempted to appease pragmatists, who wanted to avoid a direct conflict, and hardliners, who openly welcomed one. Preserving factional cohesion was critical to the professional and personal survival of both leaders. For Netanyahu, a coalitional collapse would mean early elections, political defeat, and potential imprisonment. For Khamenei, dissension among the conservative ranks would stymie his successionist ambitions. In additional to internal divisions, both leaders continually confronted popular protests over issues like judicial reforms and hostage negotiations in Israel, as well as religious policies and repressive practices in Iran. Both leaders also faced a legitimacy crisis in the form of low approval ratings for Netanyahu and low voter turnout for Khamenei.
Particularly without a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, time will tell whether Netanyahu and Khamenei can keep their hawks at bay. Doing so will be a tall task considering they were highly critical of the limited attacks against their adversary. Amid heightened tensions, it remained to be seen the degree to which both leaders could continue walking a fine line and maintaining a delicate balance between saving face and subduing hardliners while engaging in a calculated confrontation designed to achieve regional de-escalation.
By: Eric Lob
Associate Professor and Graduate Program Director for Political SciencePolitics and International Relations