Memo to the President: Addressing Venezuela's Upcoming Elections

Memo originally published by the Atlantic Council's Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

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Bottom line up front: Although Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election will take place amid high volatility, a significant likelihood of protests, and possible repression, it represents the best opportunity for a peaceful, democratic solution to the country’s long-running political crisis. The election will most likely be followed by a political negotiation process. Venezuelan economic, political, and military elites want the last three years of economic growth and greater international integration to continue, and incumbent Nicolás Maduro has a strong incentive to connect to the global economy and avoid the resumption of international pressure. The United States and its partners should take advantage of this, offering incentives and support for a Venezuelan-led negotiation process to encourage the restoration of Venezuela’s democratic institutions.

Background: Regardless of the election results, both the ruling party and the opposition will face incentives to negotiate.

A July 12 scenario-planning exercise, held by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute, identified several possible outcomes for the election and the weeks that follow.¹

Scenario 1: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare Maduro the winner, with no documented evidence of irregularities or vote tampering.

If Venezuelan electoral authorities in the National Electoral Council declare Maduro the winner, he will face the enormous challenge of “landing the plane” and continuing down the current path of sanctions relief, global reintegration, and the restoration of diplomatic relations. He cannot credibly do so without entering into a sustainable negotiation process with the opposition, in which both parties are willing to make the significant concessions required.

• The specific aftermath of a Maduro victory will depend on whether there is clear evidence of irregularities or tampering with the vote count on election day. Maduro’s best hope of winning by the numbers is if participation is low and the opposition base is unmotivated to turn out at the polls.
• Some in Maduro’s ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV) believe they can successfully mobilize the party base to outperform polls and demotivate opposition voters, as has occurred on several instances over the last twenty-five years—most recently in the 2021 state and municipal elections. They believe they can count on the minimum of five or six million votes that Maduro received in the 2018 election, which the opposition boycotted.

Scenario 2: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare Maduro the winner, despite evidence of irregularities and vote tampering.

• Even if the ruling party were to commit documented acts of electoral fraud, Maduro’s first challenge would be to reassure elements in the ruling PSUV and armed forces leadership that he would be able to continue the last three years of economic growth. He will be unable to do that in the face of opposition protests and the risk of an escalation in the international pressure campaign—which would be almost inevitable in the case of blatant vote rigging.
• The irregularities could begin before July 28. Credible polling suggests that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia has a fifteen- to twenty-percentage point lead over Maduro, although that number is lower among the most likely Venezuelan voters. If it becomes clear that Maduro’s party has no chance of winning the vote count, even through abstention, there is a chance that the Supreme Tribunal of Justice will ban González’s Democratic Unity Table Roundtable coalition—this would likely guarantee an advantage to Maduro and dissuade opposition participation. A TSJ ruling could ensure that votes for the Democratic Unity Table Roundtable would be invalidated, and would force the base to either call for abstention, cast votes for González under less popular tickets from the Un Nuevo Tiempo or Movimiento Por Venezuela parties, or align behind an alternate candidate such as Enrique Marquez.
• The ruling party could also engage in vote tampering on election day. However, this would be very difficult to conceal given the opposition’s election monitoring efforts and the presence of independent international observers affiliated with the Carter Center and the United Nations. Previous instances of fraud, such as when observers documented tampering with voter tally sheets in Bolivar state in the 2017 regional elections, have been clearly documented by comparing results with poll witness records.
• A clearly fraudulent result would likely trigger street protests organized by opposition leader María Corina Machado and others. As in previous protest waves in 2014, 2017, and 2019, this may lead to clashes with security forces, but the prospect of these mobilizations forcing a change in government is highly unlikely. All eyes will be on Machado to gauge how she would react to low turnout or electoral fraud, and what each would mean for the prospect of unrest.
• The security forces will likely be reluctant to engage in massive repression on the scale seen in the 2014 and 2017 protests, given how this fueled international condemnation and the investigation of International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan. Elites in the military and ruling party would likely apply quiet pressure on Maduro, even as he declares victory, to demonstrate an openness to reforms and a willingness to signal an element of power-sharing with the opposition in his next term.
• Such overtures could split an opposition that has become more unified today than in the past. For ruling elites, there is no interest in reversing the last three years of economic growth and returning the country to the worst period of the country’s crisis, including greater international isolation.
• The private sector in Venezuela would likely seek to ensure the continuation of government policies that have helped jumpstart growth and slow inflation to its lowest level in twelve years. Business leaders know that a fraudulent win by Maduro would jeopardize this, with all eyes on whether the US government would return to a pressure campaign that would place investment at risk.
• An escalation of the border challenges with neighboring Guyana to deflect pressure at home cannot be ruled out, though it is unlikely. This would be a double-edged sword for the government, as the military is uninterested in assuming the risk of outright conflict with Guyana and would prefer to maintain tensions at current levels.

Scenario 3: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare González the winner.

A recognized opposition victory would face a myriad of immediate challenges. To have any hope of assuming office in January 2025, González would need to reach a comprehensive agreement with Maduro and the PSUV. Any negotiations must address complicated issues such as institutional reforms, transitional justice, the release of political prisoners, and electoral conditions for the upcoming legislative and regional elections. It is difficult to imagine Maduro ceding power without ironclad guarantees from the opposition and the international community regarding his safety, immunity, and influence, and that of his inner circle.

• The opposition’s best hope of translating polling support for González into votes on July 28 is massive voter participation. Given the opposition’s own election monitoring efforts and the presence of international electoral observers, an overwhelming margin of victory would be difficult to paper over by vote tampering.
• Voter participation at around the same level as the 2013 presidential election (roughly 80 percent) could cement an opposition win and could even force actors in the ruling party to recognize the result.
• The PSUV coalition is likely to face internal fragmentation in the event of a clear, recognized González win. While moderates in the ruling coalition may be willing to bet on their political future in a post-transition landscape, more hardline elements in the PSUV and security forces could derail a transition in pursuit of self-preservation. Here, the armed forces will almost certainly have outsized influence over a transition and would likely seek to dictate the terms of a transfer of power.
• The unity of the opposition would come under strain after a González win. While Machado has been the face of the electoral campaign over the last nine months, González is on the ballot as she is currently banned from holding office as part of a longstanding campaign against her. The opposition coalition would have to define where Machado stands in the decision-making apparatus, with the added complication that the Maduro government has explicitly refused to negotiate directly with her—and will likely continue to do so if the opposition wins. This would pose an early test of González’s leadership.
• The role of the international community will be crucial. To be credible, any opposition guarantees would have to be backed up by the United States, which could offer full sanctions relief and diplomatic recognition to Caracas, and lift bounties placed on the heads of PSUV leaders. European and Latin American heads of state also have a role to play. Still, due to its sanctions policy, the US role—and Maduro’s trust that guarantees will hold under any US administration—is vital.
• The international community should pay close attention to the prospect of fragmentation in the ruling coalition, particularly among the mid-level officer ranks in the armed forces, who will also seek guarantees and to preserve their influence.
• Having been out of power for twenty-five years, the opposition’s return to government could come with a high degree of administrative turbulence. The opposition would face significant incentives to seek technical assistance and advisory support in governance, economic reform, and public administration from the private sector, international organizations, foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations—all while negotiating its policy approach with the outgoing PSUV, which would likely seek to retain political influence.

How the United States and international allies should respond:

1. Keep the focus on election data from credible international observers and independent monitoring efforts.
   • Prioritize data and reports from local and international independent observers, including the Carter Center and the United Nations, to assess the legitimacy of the election results. Communication with the public and international partners should be clear, consistent, and fact-based.
   • Rather than making a snap decision regarding developments on July 28, wait until the detailed vote count at the polling station level has been released, as has occurred in almost all previous elections. Delay any policy shift until there is a clear picture of the results.
   • Any actions should be grounded in verified data and credible sources to avoid hasty or misinformed decisions.
2. Explore opportunities for coordinated US and EU sanctions relief to accelerate incentives and advance negotiations.
   • Regardless of the election result, both González and Maduro understand they cannot govern a country in flames, and any effort to keep sanctions relief and normalization on the table will require them to negotiate the terms of governability.
   • There will be a deep need for greater multilateral coordination by sanctioning countries. The United States, as the only country to impose oil and financial sanctions against Venezuela, has outsized leverage, but the European Union and others that have sanctioned government officials can also place sanctions on the table to support negotiations.
   • Any solution will also require complex discussions regarding the restoration of the country’s democratic institutions while ensuring a place for Chavismo in the country’s political landscape.
3. No need to start from scratch.
   • The basis of any dialogue should be the 2021 Mexico City memorandum of understanding, which has served as the framework for international negotiations facilitated by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry with US, EU, and other international support.
   • This agreement outlined a seven-part agenda for dialogue efforts that have not been fully addressed, including guarantees of political rights for all, the restoration of constitutional order, coexistence and reparation for victims, economic reforms, and the verification and implementation of future agreements.
   • From there, talks can expand to focus on power sharing, the release of political prisoners, a judiciary overhaul, reforms of the security forces, the separation of powers, and improvements to electoral conditions ahead of 2025 legislative and regional elections.
   • The United States and international allies should focus on achievable, incremental progress rather than aiming for comprehensive solutions immediately. Small victories can build momentum and trust.
4. Promote a regional response led by Colombia and Brazil.
   • The United States and allies should emphasize solidarity among these neighboring countries, encouraging them to take lead roles in support of negotiation efforts while ensuring that Norwegian facilitators retain their influence on ongoing talks. Brazil, which has ceded space to Colombia so far, in particular could play a more active role.
   • Joint statements and actions can amplify impact, and the international community should formalize the ‘’Group of Friends’’ mechanism outlined in the 2021 memorandum of understanding. The creation of such a group, while still giving primacy to existing negotiations, would provide clarity for regional leaders seeking to coordinate Venezuela policy and allow more formal negotiating channels with Venezuela to incentivize more robust compliance with existing accords.
5. Regardless of outcome, consider the long-term benefits of an expanded Western footprint in Venezuela.
   • Specific licenses issued by the Treasury Department have allowed Western energy companies to maintain operations in Venezuela. The current foreign investment framework permits new modes of governance and payment and new rules of reporting, and provides opportunities for greater transparency.
   • Though sanctions are an important part of the United States’ leverage in Venezuela, there is space and good reason for this investment framework to be expanded. It is not in the US interest to sit back and watch as its rivals deepen their footprints in the country with the largest proven oil reserves on the planet—nor is it in the US interest to see Venezuela grow closer to these authoritarian powers and drift further into authoritarian rule.
   • Allied governments should continue to consider the broader geopolitical context, including relationships with China, Russia, and other influential countries with interests in Venezuela. The goal should be balanced policies that address these dynamics, acknowledge Venezuela’s role in global energy markets, and prioritize the humanitarian needs and human rights of the Venezuelan people.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and launched the center’s work on Venezuela in 2017. He is an adjunct professor at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Brian Fonseca is director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and an adjunct professor in the department of politics and international relations at Florida International University’s Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs.

Eduardo A. Gamarra is a tenured full professor of political science in the department of politics and international relations at Florida International University.

¹ Aspects of the discussion during our scenario-planning exercise informed this memo, but the memo is not meant to reflect the views of any participants other than the authors. There was, however, broad agreement that, independent of the results of the election, the winner will face incentives to negotiate the terms of governability, avoid a deepening of the crisis, and prevent another cycle of unrest and repression.