

CHILEAN

Military Culture

2020



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The FIU-USSOUTHCOM Academic Partnership Military Culture Series

Florida International University's Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy (FIU-JGI) and FIU's Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center (FIU-LACC), in collaboration with the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), formed the FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership. The partnership entails FIU providing research-based knowledge to further USSOUTHCOM's understanding of the political, strategic, and cultural dimensions that shape military behavior in Latin America and the Caribbean. This goal is accomplished by employing a military culture approach. This initial phase of military culture consisted of a yearlong research program that focused on developing a standard analytical framework to identify and assess the military culture of three countries. FIU facilitated professional presentations of two countries (Cuba and Venezuela) and conducted field research for one country (Honduras).

The overarching purpose of the project is two-fold: to generate a rich and dynamic base of knowledge pertaining to political, social, and strategic factors that influence military behavior; and to contribute to USSOUTHCOM's Socio-Cultural Analysis (SCD) Program. Utilizing the notion of military culture, USSOUTHCOM has commissioned FIU-JGI to conduct country-studies in order to explain how Latin American militaries will behave in the context of U.S. military engagement.

The FIU research team defines military culture as "the internal and external factors — historical, cultural, social, political, economic — that shape the dominant values, attitudes, and behaviors of the military institution, that inform how the military views itself and its place and society, and that shape how the military may interact with other institutions, entities, and governments." FIU identifies and expounds upon the cultural factors that inform the rationale behind the perceptions and behavior of select militaries by analyzing historical evolution, sources of identity and pride, and societal roles.

To meet the stated goals, FIU's JGI and LACC hosted academic workshops in Miami and brought subject matter experts together from throughout the U.S., Latin America and the Caribbean, to explore and discuss militaries in Latin America and the Caribbean. When possible, FIU-JGI researchers conduct field research in select countries to examine these factors through in-depth interviews, focus groups, and/or surveys. At the conclusion of each workshop and research trip, FIU publishes a findings report, which is presented at USSOUTHCOM.

The views expressed in *Chilean Military Culture* are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government, Florida International University, or any other affiliated institutions. This report was funded by the United States Southern Command.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Chilean armed forces have a long and successful history which justifies their pride in this institution. The Chileans have succeeded at creating a professional force which the 2019 version of *The Military Balance* called “professional and capable, if compact.” However, military rule between 1973 and 1990 left scars in Chilean society which continue to this day.

The four most influential events in the history of the Chilean military involved three wars and one *coup d’etat*.

- The victory in the War of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (1836-1839) led to a close connection between the military and Chilean national identity. This led the Chilean Army to believe that their institution was derived from the people which has served as an important factor in the world view of the troops.
- Their defeat in the War with Spain (1865-1866) led the Chilean armed forces to vow to dominate the southeastern Pacific. They have succeeded in their mission to dominate the region and these self-perceptions helped with their continued professionalization and continue to this day.
- Chile’s decisive victory over Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) cemented the reputation of the Chilean military as a powerful unit. It also moved the Chilean border north as they gained control over the entire Bolivian Pacific coast and one Peruvian province. Unfortunately, it also resulted in hard feelings between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. These tensions are still present today.
- The 1973 *Coup d’etat* led to military rule between until 1990. This period brought order and democratic stability together with a developing economy, however it also saw human rights violations committed by military personnel; the Chilean Truth Commission identified 3,428 cases of forced disappearances, killings, torture, and kidnappings.

External sources of identity center on the prominent influence of British, Prussian, and U.S. militaries. The armed services have chosen to emulate what they thought was the best in the world at that time of their maturation. The Army selected the Prussian Army, the Navy the British Navy, and the Air Force and Marines (who are part of the Navy) chose to model themselves after their counterparts from the United States.

The Chilean societies’ view of the military has shifted significantly over time. In the 1800s and early 1900s, society viewed the military as deriving from the people and as the ultimate arbiter in Chilean politics. After several military interventions in politics in 1924/5, the military sought to stay out of domestic politics. They succeeded until 1973, which is one of the best records in Latin America.

The inauguration of Socialist President Salvador Allende in 1971 was followed by a significant rise in polarization between the far left, the moderate left, the center, and the right. The first group sought confrontation to address societal issues, the second sought a more gradual approach, while the third and fourth groups sought to maintain the status quo. On September 11, 1973, the military made their move, and Allende committed suicide. Army General Augusto Pinochet eventually took over the junta and led Chile until 1990.

The armed forces under general Pinochet conceptualized their approach as a new military-political mission: to reshape and restructure Chile's society, mainly through redesigning the economy and purging dissident elements. In June 1974, the government created the National Intelligence Directorate (*Directorio de Inteligencia Nacional*—DINA), which operated until August 1977. The military government passed an amnesty law in 1978 that ensured that almost all human rights violations committed prior to the date of that decree would not be prosecuted. They followed with a new constitution in 1981. President Pinochet allowed a referendum in 1989, and the Chilean people chose to return to democracy. The military transitioned out of power in 1990.

The Chilean military since then has sought to maintain three things:

- Their level of professionalism;
- Their funding levels which were guaranteed as part of the agreement to hand power back to civilian leaders, and;
- The respect of the Chilean people

Fissures in Chilean society have continued. In October 2019, cleavages between the left and right resurfaced. The military has sought to avoid taking sides. When the opposition took to the streets, the President called in the military who imposed order, but emphasized that they “were not at war with anyone.” Society appreciated this neutrality, and the military seeks to maintain it. The Chilean military, however, will be in a difficult situation until Chilean political leaders are able to achieve a political solution,

In summary, the Chilean armed forces are very competent and professional. They seek to avoid entanglement in Chilean politics. Recent events have shown how difficult this can be.

CHILEAN MILITARY IDENTITY

Chile is a country that sees itself as distinct from other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Unlike most Spanish conquest in the New World, Chile was settled by family units. This, combined with geographic isolation, allowed Chile to develop differently than most of Latin America.

The Chilean military has a long and successful history which justifies their pride in this institution. Each of their armed services has chosen to emulate what they thought was the best in the world at that time of their maturation. The Army selected the Prussian Army, the Navy the British Navy, and the Air Force and Marines (who are part of the Navy) chose to model themselves after their counterparts from the United States. The Chileans have succeeded at creating a very professional force which the 2019 version of *The Military Balance* called “professional and capable, if compact.”¹

The Colonial Era

The roots of the Chilean military date back to the militias that the Spanish Empire set up to provide for local security during the colonial era (1540 to 1818 in the case of Chile). Initially, the Viceroyalty of Peru was the seat of government for South American colonies. As the Spanish colonies grew, Spain split the region and added another viceroyalty to govern northern South America in 1717 and southeastern South America in 1776. The Viceroyalty of Peru was responsible for Chile, but distance and difficulty in travel caused them to make Chile a Captaincy-General and an *Audencia*, which respectively made Chile semi-autonomous in military and administrative matters.

The Spanish realized that their regular force army could not protect all the vulnerable coastline of their colonies from California south to Chile and up the Atlantic coast to the frontier with Brazil. Spanish King Phillip II created the Army of the Chilean Realm (*Ejército del Reino de Chile*) in January of 1603. This organization constituted the first army organized in Spanish America.² Local workers made up the main body of the force while the officers were Criollos or pure-blooded Europeans born in the new world. Just like George Washington had studied war with the British, the Chilean local security forces and future leaders such as Bernardo O’Higgins learned war from the Spanish military, certainly a force to be reckoned with in the 1600s. The organization and discipline that they inherited from Spanish military ordinances provided these forces with an initial grounding of professionalism and order that remained during the 18th century.

The militia had two main missions: to protect the colony from outside European aggression and to fight off the indigenous to their south. These Mapuche (then called Araucanians by Europeans)

¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance* (London: Routledge), 15 Feb 2019. p. 387

² Ejército de Chile, “Quienes Somos,” Available at <https://www.ejercito.cl/?menu&cid=17>

held the Chileans north of the Bío-Bío River until the 1850s.³ Colonial policy dictated that the Army would keep the Mapuche contained while subsidizing friendly Mapuche *caciques* or leaders, a policy that an independent Chile would continue until well into the 1800s.⁴ Overall, Chileans fought with Mapuche for over 300 years, which provided them with combat experience that many other regional militaries lacked. These forces had to confront an agile adversary, which required constant patrolling and low-intensity conflict. This built military skills in the colonists and conditioned them to live in what was called the “land of war.”⁵

The prowess of the Mapuche and the efforts of the Europeans who faced them provided the Chilean military with a storied history. They celebrate the feats of the Caciques, Toquis, and Araucanian heroes as well as the Spanish leaders who gave their lives in the defense of the Kingdom of Chile. This provided them with a military culture that celebrates courage, sacrifice, heroism, and warrior spirit.

Independence

Independence was a drawn-out affair. Napoleon’s conquest of Spain in 1808 de-legitimized the Spanish crown in the eyes of the colonists. Just as with the United States, three factions emerged: those loyal to the King, those who wanted independence, and those who wanted to stay out of the way. Early independence activity was mainly political. However, both sides eventually reverted to violence, with the first major action at the Battle of San Carlos in May 1813.⁶ The early battles were mainly fought by local troops who followed their leaders, either Royalists or supporters of independence. By late 1814, the royalists were ascendant and *Independistas* mainly defeated; Chilean commander Bernardo O’Higgins led tattered remnants of his army across the Andes to Mendoza, Argentina. This would be an annealing experience, just as the Continental Army retreated to Valley Forge, Pennsylvania to regroup after defeat in Philadelphia at the hands of the British Army in late 1777.

José de San Martín also came to Mendoza after liberating Argentina; he sought to export independence to Chile and to liberate Peru. The two leaders merged their armies and prepared for operations in Chile. The combined army maneuvered into Chile in January 1817. During this period, “the Chilean Army was a triumphant and widely praised organization” that participated in “an epic event in national history.”⁷ On February 13, 1817, notables of Chile gathered to form a government and named O’Higgins as “Supreme Director” of Chile.⁸ O’Higgins decreed the establishment of the Chilean Military Academy on February 21, 1817, which founded the Chilean

³ Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵ Sergio Villalobos, *Chile y su Historia* (Santiago, CL: Ed. Universitaria, 2001).

⁶ Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America’s Wars Vol I – the Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899* (Virginia: Brassey’s Inc, 2003).

⁷ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.

Army (*Ejército de Chile*) consisting of 5,000 soldiers and officers.⁹ The nascent Chilean Army won formal independence from Spain at the Battle of Maipú on April 5, 1818, which guaranteed independence, but more struggle lay ahead.

As the national leader, O'Higgins also saw the need for a navy. In 1817, at the end of Battle of Chacabuco, O'Higgins declared: "This battle and a hundred more are insignificant if we do not dominate the sea."¹⁰ This led to the 1818 formation of the First National (Navy) Squadron, and British Captain Lord Thomas Cochrane arrived to take command. He is now considered the founder of the Chilean navy and is one of the most revered in the pantheon of Chilean heroes, alongside O'Higgins and Navy Captain Arturo Prat, the hero of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). They also founded the Academy for young Midshipmen (the predecessor of the present Navy Academy), the Chilean Marine Corps, and the first Office for Logistics, which is seen as "the foundations of the organic structure of the Navy."¹¹

In the wake of Independence, Bernardo O'Higgins settled into ruling Chile while the military played a strong role in politics.¹² Between independence and 1831, the army played a leading role in politics and created and destroyed governments.¹³ This changed after 1831. Between then and 1924, Chile enjoyed an enviable record among Latin American states with regard to military obedience to civilian authority.¹⁴ Civil-military relations were marked by military obedience to civilian leadership: "alone among Latin American republics of the (19th) century, Chile possessed a truly functional army and a civilian political system capable of containing it as such."¹⁵

The wars of independence created the Army and the Navy, and gave each a hero: O'Higgins and Cochrane, just as the US independence struggle provided the heroes George Washington and John Paul Jones. It also provided the Chilean military with a strong military identity, a deep love for Chile, and a spirit of renunciation and personal dedication to the service of the motherland.

In the wake of independence, Chile enjoyed a favorable geopolitical situation. To the east the border with Argentina ran along the spine of the Andes. This prevented war between the two; their competition was marked by skirmishes along the border but no serious conflict.¹⁶ To the north lay Bolivia's outlet to the sea and then Peru. This was the focus of the Chilean military. To the south lay the unconquered indigenous tribes. The presence of the Mapuche gave Chile an advantage. Not

⁹ Ibid, 23.

¹⁰ Armada de Chile. "Who Are We, Our History," Available at <https://www.armada.cl/armada/chilean-navy/who-we-are/our-history/2017-04-06/112033.html>

¹¹ Ibid, Armada de Chile.

¹² See Jay Kinsbruner, *Bernardo O'Higgins* (Woodbridge, CT: Twayne Publishers, 1968).

¹³ Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 3.

¹⁴ Ibid, 3.

¹⁵ Ibid, 4.

¹⁶ Ibid, 6.

only did they have to maintain a certain military strength, but constant skirmishing gave the Chilean Army valuable combat experience.¹⁷

WAR OF THE PERUVIAN-BOLIVIAN CONFEDERATION (1836-1839)

In 1828, Bolivia and Peru united, formed a Confederation (Bolivia was known as Upper Peru in the colonial era). Chile perceived this as an existential threat. Chilean individuals entered into the political maneuverings rampant in both Peru and Bolivia. In August 1835, Chilean exiles tried to take over the Chilean town of Chiloé; Chile seized three Peruvian warships in retaliation. Chile demanded the dissolution of the Confederation as the prerequisite for peace. Those seeking war on both sides prevailed and Chile declared war in December 1836. After several years of maneuvering at sea and on land, Chile decisively defeated Confederation forces at the Battle of Yungay in northern Peru. This created a close connection between the military and Chilean national identity. The troops returned to Chile and were received by the citizenry with a new anthem that was the reflection of the Chilean identity for a year after the creation of the current national anthem. This provided in the populace an early sense of unity within a national identity. This led the Chilean Army to believe that their institution was derived from the people in arms; this has served as an important factor in the world view of the troops.¹⁸

The two major lessons learned from this war were that 1) because Chile had the only standing army in South America, they had an advantage on the battlefield and 2) naval supremacy was a requirement for victory in the region.¹⁹ The other major result was the confirmation that the Chilean military was “obedient to civil authority and designed to defend as well as maintain order.”²⁰

The 1850s

The decade after the war with the Confederation saw the navy mothballed to save money and the Army concentrating on the indigenous groups to the south. The Army remained active, deployed in the south to face the Mapuche as well as the east and north on the frontiers with Argentina and Bolivia.

The late 1840s and early 1850s were a time of great social agitation throughout the world. This was most famously manifested in the 1848 revolutions in Europe. This antagonism manifested

¹⁷Sergio Villalobos, *Chile y su Historia* (Santiago, CL, Ed. Universitaria, 2001).

¹⁸Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 49.

¹⁹Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America's Wars Vol I – the Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899* (Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 2003), p. 139.

²⁰Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History*, (University of New Mexico Press 1976), p. 49.

itself in Latin America as a series of intraclass rebellions throughout the region²¹ which usually saw frictions between Liberals (who were generally for democracy, education and de-emphasizing the Church) and Conservatives (who favored the status quo, elites and the Church). Chile saw two major rebellions in 1851 and 1859. In 1851, members of the Chilean Society of Equality (*Sociedad de la Igualdad*) bribed some 600 soldiers to rise against the government. Loyal troops defeated them at the cost of about 100 dead. Five months later a General who lost the race for the presidency led a second rebellion. The rebels were "an amalgam of old and new elements of society, each with their own grievances" while the government was supported by the landed aristocracy and most of the regular army.²² The government defeated the uprising leading to a general amnesty and the promulgation of a new civil code. Although this succeeded in calming tensions, by 1859 intra-Conservative frictions built into a new rebellion. Once again, the government defeated the uprising, but this time the Chilean body politic adopted a new approach and the two major political parties formed the "Liberal Conservative Fusion" party, which significantly decreased internal Chilean friction. These uprisings led to more inclusive policies in Chile which resulted in significant amounts of economic and social development; this provided the basis for growth and economic strength into the future.

War with Spain 1865-1866

Internal victory in the uprisings of the 1850s did not prepare the Chilean state for a war with Spain in 1865. Spain never recognized Peru's independence and posted a fleet off the coast of South America. When a brawl onshore ended with Spanish dead, Spain acted aggressively which started a war. Chile joined Peru because they thought that Spain sought to reconquer their colonies. It was an entirely naval war in which Spain bested the Chilean Navy who were in a "state of disrepair" so that Chile "possessed neither a fleet adequate to protect its commerce nor coastal defenses capable of defending its major ports."²³ Although the Chileans enjoyed small successes, the Spanish fleet shelled the major port of Valparaiso in March 1866, causing significant impact on the Chilean economy. The Chilean merchant fleet was nearly destroyed. After the Spanish fleet attacked the Peruvian port of Callao the next month, they considered their mission complete and sailed for home. Although the peace was not signed until 1883, the conflict ended by mid-1866.²⁴ The major lesson learned for Chile was that command of the sea was vital, reinforcing the lessons of the war against the Confederation. This is when Chile vowed to dominate the southeastern Pacific, a belief that they hold to this day. This reinforced the Chilean Navy's predilection to imitate the Royal Navy.

²¹Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America's Wars Vol I – the Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899* (Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 2003) p. 293.

²²Ibid, p. 290.

²³Ibid, p. 335.

²⁴ Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 118.

The War of the Pacific (1879-1884)

A major external crisis erupted in 1878. The War of the Pacific constituted the defining event of Chilean regional international relations. It saw Chile facing off against Bolivia and Peru again. There were a variety of frictions in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru that led to this war. First, the border between Bolivia and Chile was inherited from colonial times and was not well-known or demarcated because the Atacama Desert was sparsely populated, insignificant, and inhospitable, so “neither country seemed unduly concerned over the exact location of the frontier.”²⁵ The discovery of guano in 1839 made the area suddenly important economically. Chilean capital began the exploitation of minerals, which caused some friction.

In 1874, “after a great deal of wrangling which almost degenerated into war,” Bolivia and Chile signed a treaty that recognized Bolivian sovereignty to 24° South, just south of Antofagasta. Chile abandoned claims north of that latitude and Bolivia promised not to raise taxes on Chilean companies operating on their territory in the Atacama. That same year, Chile learned about the existence of a Bolivian/Peruvian Treaty of Defensive Alliance—but not the details—from Argentine sources²⁶ which made the idea of an alliance with all three of their neighbors against Chile a potential reality. Although Argentina ended up not joining the alliance, this increased friction in the area.

In February 1878, Bolivia established taxes on Chilean companies—the famous 10 percent tax—which according to Chile violated the 1874 boundary treaty. Bolivia threatened to confiscate the property they had taxed, and Chilean armed forces occupied the port city of Antofagasta on February 14, 1879. Bolivia declared war on Chile and invoked its mutual defense treaty with Peru. Chile declared war on both on April 5, 1879.²⁷

Historian Bruce W. Farcau discredits two main theories as to the cause of the war: Bolivian provocation or conscious, premeditated aggression on the part of Chile. He contends that “the attitude of the peoples of the region was just ripe for war” as fitting the bill for the cause of the war.²⁸ The first six months saw the Peruvians and Chileans fighting to gain maritime superiority. The Peruvians did well at first at the Battle of Iquique where their ironclad *Huáscar* destroyed the

²⁵Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America's Wars Vol I – the Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899*, (Washington, DC, Brassey's Inc, 2003), p. 375; Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 127.

²⁶Historia General de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina, *Las relaciones con los demás países americanos durante las presidencias de Mitre y Sarmiento*, <http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-066.htm>.

²⁷Encyclopedia Britannica, *War of the Pacific, South American history*, (March, 2020), <https://www.britannica.com/event/War-of-the-Pacific>.

²⁸Bruce W. Farcau, *The Ten Cents War – Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), p. 45.

wooden ship *Esmeralda* and made the Captain Arturo Prat²⁹ a national hero for his example of courage and heroism when he fought to the death leading his crew over the side instead of surrendering, fighting “until they sank in the bay of Iquique with the Chilean Ensign fluttering at the top of the mast.”³⁰ Prat’s valiant demise caused a significant upsurge in patriotism and many Chileans signed up for both the Navy and the Army.

After six months, the Chileans captured the *Huáscar*, gain control of the seas, and begin the combined Army/Navy campaign up the west coast of South America. Because of the large distances involved and the inhospitable nature of the desert terrain, the two services had to cooperate. The key to Chilean success was what the United States Marine Corps would later call “Operational Maneuver from the Sea.”³¹ The Navy sailed up the coast to the next major town and set up a blockade and land Marines, isolating the garrison.³² At the same time, the Army marched units up the coast and seal off the landward side with the Navy providing provisions along the way. They repeated this maneuver four times, eventually arriving at Lima Peru in January 1881 and decisively winning the war.

After victory at sea, it took four other long ground campaigns to finish the war. The Chilean Army, made up of recruits that were called up for war, fought five years of campaigns. They first had to defeat the Bolivian Army, and then the Peruvian Army. They had to cross the desert and fight in a series of battles in Tacna and Arica in Southern Peru, and then capture the Peruvian capitol Lima. In order to take Lima, the Chilean Army went through two large scale and hard-fought battles in Chorrillos and Miraflores under the command of Chilean Army General Manuel Baquedano. Despite the Chileans capturing Lima, the Peruvians continued to fight. The Chileans had to fight another campaign was necessary in the Peruvian countryside or *Sierra Peruana*, sending out four major expeditions between April 1881 and July 1883. These columns suffered from cold and altitude sickness but were eventually successful. One major event redounds through Chilean military history. At one point the Peruvians managed to gain a significant advantage over 77 Chileans in the *Combate de La Concepción*. The Chileans “contemptuously rejected” a demand to surrender and died to the man in the subsequent fighting³³. As the French Foreign Legion celebrates the Battle of Camerone, the Chilean Army remembers the death before dishonor, which had been the slogan of the Army throughout the war. The War just ended after the Battle of Huamachuco, in July 1883.

²⁹Augusto Ramirez Sosa and J. Raimundo del R. Valenzuela, *El Combate de Iquique (21 de mayo de 1879) por uno de los tripulantes de la “Esmeralda,”* (Imprenta de Los Tiempos, Bandera 24, Santiago, CL, 2nd Edition, 1880).

³⁰Armada de Chile. *Who Are We, Our History*, Available at <https://www.armada.cl/armada/chilean-navy/who-we-are/our-history/2017-04-06/112033.html>.

³¹ Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, “*Operational Maneuver from the Sea*,” Washington, DC. 1996.

³²Contraalmirante IM Miguel Alvarez Ebner, *Los Soldados del Mar en las Campañas del a Guerra del Pacífico 1879-1881*, Viña del Mar, Chile, Armada de Chile, 2000.

³³ Farcau. *Ten Cent War*, p. 179

It took decades to straighten out the territorial results of the war. The October 20, 1883, Treaty of Ancón between Peru and Chile gave Chile the provinces of Tacna and Arica.³⁴ The Treaty of Lima on June 3, 1929 gave Tacna back to Peru while Chile kept Arica.³⁵ Bolivia and Chile agreed to a truce at Valparaíso on April 4, 1884, which gave Chile control of Antofagasta province or the entire Bolivian coast. This was recognized with the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1904.³⁶

Chile won the war, but what was more important to their military identity was the consolidation of values that had been forged in previous wars. Their tradition captured the ideal of fighting to the death without ever surrendering and that discipline was an essential element of military units. The modern Chilean armed forces believe in the honor of their members and a professionalism that is continually perfected. Another important aspect of this conflict is that the Chilean Army was made up of citizens of the countryside, miners, and workers which came from different social classes, reinforcing the previous phenomenon of the people in arms. Another important aspect was that Chile continued its democracy; indeed, during the War itself presidential elections were held. This reflects the patriotic values many Chileans feel make up the modern military identity of Chile: the military handles wars and supports the population's right to have elections. In turn, everyone is supposed to be patriotic.

The major outcome for Chile itself was that they gained control of over 55,000 square miles that were rich in a variety of minerals and saltpeter, essential at the time for manufacturing munitions. This made Chile even richer. However, this victory also contained the seeds for future regional problems. The humiliating defeat of Bolivian and Peruvian forces at the hands of the Chileans together with Chile taking large amounts of Bolivian and Peruvian territory was a devastating loss with economic, demographic, and prestige implications, and ensured that this would be a point of contention well into the future. Indeed, relations between Bolivia and Peru on one side and Chile on the other are still difficult over 140 years later. Bolivia still has an annual "March to the Sea" to commemorate the loss of their outlet to the Pacific. This problem was exacerbated because the "already well-developed" Chilean pride and feelings of superiority was enhanced by victory.³⁷ The Chilean armed forces gained a sense of pride at their achievements and that their political leaders were competent enough to be obeyed, making them almost unique in South America. This, however, did not endear Chile to any of their neighbors.

³⁴ Victor Andres Belaunde, Treaty of Ancon in the light of International Law, Available at http://www.archive.org/stream/treatyofanconin100bela/treatyofanconin100bela_djvu.txt.

³⁵ Encyclopedia.com, "Lima, Treaty of (1929)," Available at <https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/lima-treaty-1929>.

³⁶ Project Gutenberg, "Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1904," [http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/Treaty_of_Peace_and_Friendship_\(1904\)](http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/Treaty_of_Peace_and_Friendship_(1904)).

³⁷ Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 146.

Professionalization

Another result of the War of the Pacific was that the Chilean Navy continued to be close to the Royal Navy while the Army sought to emulate the Prussian Army. In the wake of this war, the Chilean military underwent a process of professionalization. The aforementioned respect for the Prussian Army led the Chileans to appoint a German, Captain Emil Körner, who had fought with distinction against France, to reorganize the Chilean military instruction system in 1885.³⁸ Upon his arrival, Körner reorganized the General Bernardo O'Higgins Military Academy, inaugurated a staff school called the Academy of War (Academia de Guerra—ACAGUE) and “the Chilean Army began a new life,”³⁹ Graduates were sent to Germany for further professional military education (PME) and “in less than five years Körner had molded an incipient military elite”.⁴⁰ ACAGUE graduates helped to stand up other war colleges throughout Latin America and still produces officers for the Chilean Army and has relations with peers such as the US Army War College and the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Germany. Indeed, Chilean officers that graduate from the US Army War College return to ACAGUE to teach.

In 1891, Chile had a civil war between the President and Congress. Most of the Army supported the President (although they were badly divided), while the vast majority of the Navy supported Congress. Thus, the forces were evenly balanced at the beginning of the war the Chilean Army needed a navy and the Chilean Navy needed an army. Prussia supported the Army and the President while the UK supported the Navy and Congress. One major advantage that Congress enjoyed was that Emil Körner supported them; this gave them a solid land leader. It proved impossible to buy a navy in time the thousands of veterans from the War of the Pacific and open sea lines of communications enabled the Congress to build an army and the Congress won. They dominated the political system until 1931. The Chilean Navy became “the preeminent military service within Chile,” which no other Latin American navy achieved.⁴¹

THE MODERN CHILEAN ARMED FORCES

Frederick Nunn discusses the fact that Chile has not been to war since 1883, but this fact has not weakened the Chilean armed forces. As Nunn notes,

a martial tradition prevailed. Triumphant twice in the nineteenth century against her Andean neighbors and successful in stifling indigenous resistance to southern frontier expansion, Chile held her army in esteem. The fact that Chile was surrounded on all sides by potentially hostile states helped to perpetuate the national belief in a need for military

³⁸ Frederick M. Nunn, *Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America 1890-1940* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 1983), p. 37.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁴¹ Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America's Wars Vol I – the Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899*, (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc, 2003) p. 404.

strength...Chile was involved in all the tension zones of the continent, so the belief that a strong army was indispensable never vanished entirely from Chilean minds.⁴²

The Chilean military continued to professionalize while the government provided resources. Although there were periodic tensions between the armed forces and the government, the military recognized civilian authority, mainly due to executive strength, civil-military homogeneity and officer-class cohesion.⁴³ The Army intervened in 1924 and the Navy mutinied in 1931 as part of a communist-inspired and Depression-caused uprising which required Army intervention. In 1927, Army General Carlos Ibanez del Campo, the President of Chile, used political rhetoric to discuss how to “resolve the ‘social question’ and cleanse the body politic,” embodying the political lessons of anticommunism, political intolerance, and the identification of opposition with treason.⁴⁴ The military “precipitated constitutional and legal reforms that transformed the old political order” between 1924 and 1932, but it was not until 1973 that “the armed forces again be needed to fulfill this patriotic duty.”⁴⁵ The 1960s saw the development of the “National Security Doctrine” as developed by the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG, the joint Brazilian war college, the equivalent of the US National War College). However, civil-military relations continued as before during this period. In the early 1970s, Chile was one of only three countries in Latin America still ruled by civilians (the others being Colombia and Costa Rica). This changed in 1973, when the Chilean military overthrew President Salvador Allende. As the War of the Pacific was the defining event for Chile’s regional international relations, 1973 was the defining moment of internal Chilean politics in general and Chilean civil-military relations.

Throughout their history, the Chilean military had been a strong defender of the Chilean state. Although cleavages in Chilean society have manifested themselves several times through violence and military control, until 1973 the role of the military had been a positive one that supports the Chilean cultural norm of strong civilian leadership. The integration of all classes in the military and their impressive performance in regional wars have had a positive impact on nation-building and the formation of Chilean culture and society. This allows Chile to cleave more towards the Charles Tilly European model⁴⁶ of a state consolidating bureaucratic control over their territory and society and building a military that supports the state rather than the typically Latin American model discussed by Miguel Ángel Centeno where a weak state competes with their own military for access to societal resources, creating cleavages and not acting as a unifying force.⁴⁷

⁴² Frederick M. Nunn, *Yesterday’s Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America 1890-1940* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 1983), p. 84.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 92.

⁴⁴ Brian Loveman, *For La Patria – Politics and the Armed forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources, 1999), p. 84.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 85.

⁴⁶ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992* (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishers, 1992).

⁴⁷ Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003).

FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON MILITARY IDENTITY

Spanish influence

From its origins in the remote Arauco War, Chilean military modes were formed by Spanish influence and the imprint of the Spanish professional army in 1603. Their mission was to safeguard the southern border with the indigenous Arauco and defend the empire against the attack of privateers and enemy pirates of the Spanish crown. However, despite this first foreign influence on the ethos of the Chilean Army, they maintained a particular phenomenon over the centuries of the history of that institution wherein external influence did not radically change the local and native behavior.⁴⁸

A major factor that marked the Spanish cultural penetration in shaping the ethos of the Chilean Army was the “General Ordinance of the Army,” promulgated during the rule of Charles III (1759-1788). The militia absorbed the ethical standards that defined the behavior of the troops of the King's regulars. These ordinances established the organization and doctrine of the Spanish military bodies, giving their character a valorous and dogmatic imprint that regulated the form of the procedures of the troops as well as the substance of the organization itself, operating within the framework of Just War theory and, therefore, avoiding excess in their behavior towards their enemies.

French Influence

The inherent Chilean ideals of freedom and independence influenced both the political regime of the state and the formation of its army during the early days of the republic. Ideas developed by both the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte (as the organizer of the *Grande Armée*), served as sources new strategic thought and a new conception of the conduct of war.⁴⁹ This influence was fresh at the time of Chilean independence. It increased as French officers served in Chile as instructors and specialists in the engineering, mapping, topography, military administration, general staff, and exploration branches. This cemented the foundations of the Army of the Andes as a modern army whose purpose was to ensure the independence of Chile and Peru⁵⁰ while Simon Bolivar concurrently fought to liberate northern South America.

The influence of French military culture is reflected in Chilean uniforms that are very similar to the uniforms worn by that nation; President Manuel Bulnes (1841-1846 and 1846-1851) also led

⁴⁸ Roberto Ramis, *Academic Study to qualify for the title of General Staff Officer*, (Santiago, CL, ACAGUE, 2015).

⁴⁹ Some Independence leaders knew Napoleonic tactics; José Miguel Carrera and José de San Martín learned these tactics defending the crown of Spain when Spanish patriots fought to remove the French-imposed ruler and restore the legitimate Spanish King Ferdinand VII.

⁵⁰ Patricia Arancibia Clavel, Op. “El Ejercito De Los Chilenos 1540-1920” (Santiago, CL: Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2007), p. 157.

a modernization process in the Army by sending officers to study in France in order to learn military tactics, techniques and procedures that were replicated at the Military School and adapted to the Chilean reality.

Chile adopted various regulations that were translated directly from French to Spanish. These regulations reformed the teaching and instruction systems which allowed the optimization of the infantry, cavalry, artillery, and the nascent engineer branch. This French influence remained strong in Chile from Independence to the Pacific War but had disappeared definitively by the Civil War of 1891 which ended with congressional victory. Prussian military culture then replaced the French as a reference for the Chilean military because the Prussian Emil Korner had backed the Congressional side, and Prussia decisively won the Franco-Prussian War.

Prussian influence

German instructors arrived to join the Army and numerous Chilean officers were sent to Germany to learn the new basis of strategic thinking and the conduct of the war. Germans influenced the process of an integral modernization of the military ethos. First, they changed strategic thinking with an updated conception of the conduct of war and operations on the battlefield. This signified a complete doctrinal change together with adopting modern armaments such as artillery pieces as well as new equipment for infantry, sapper or combat engineers as well as telecommunications equipment. All the equipment of a new army was acquired or updated, even down to the field kitchens. The major reforms required that the units and higher command structure of the Army had to be reorganized. Additionally, Chile changed the training of officers and soldiers based on German doctrine. This included rules of discipline, military organizations, uniforms and traditions (enduring to this day), which permeated the Chilean soldier with astonishing ease.

To support these changes, the country adopted compulsory military service as a recruiting measure. This last innovation created a major rapprochement between the Army and civil society, revitalizing the ties that had united them and fostering national unity, which helped enhance the national defense of Chile.

The influence of the United States

After World War II, the United States became the most prominent military reference point. The American influence brought with it a realization of the global nature of the threats and therefore revealed the need for active international cooperation. As such, Chile signed a military agreement with the United States in 1952, which allowed the Chilean military to acquire important equipment. This influx of ships, aircraft, tanks and other combat equipment in Army units produced doctrinal change. For the Chilean military ethos and its identity, this new influence meant an urgent need to modernize the systems of instruction and training of the forces that were still based on the German system, which had produced phenomenal tactical capability but failed at the strategic level in both

World Wars. Therefore, it was necessary to significantly change Chilean PME and to rewrite numerous charts, regulations and documents according to the new requirements involved in the American modernization challenge.

The influence of American military culture placed a new focus on education in order to gain greater capabilities from new approaches to warfare and technology, where professionalism is reflected in the adoption of combat methods that allow the optimization of force, the reduction of casualties, smaller and more dispersed units, and the creation of a new combat approaches, such as the use of armored cavalry and other types of combat support such as modern telecommunications. This was a period of demanding professionalism. Many officers went to the United States for training and education. Although the Chilean armed forces were very small and had limited resources, they continued to operate at a very high professional intellectual level which was very successful in the schools and academies of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

MILITARY IDENTITY AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS

The Civil War of 1891 was a Republican crisis that led to regime change, but it also—as civil wars do—divided families and comrades-in-arms who had fought side by side in the War of the Pacific. This division was reflected in a previously unheard-of hatred between those on both sides, exacerbated by the press, which was used as a medium to pass virulent and insulting comments among everyone involved, whether Congressional or Presidential supporters.

This constituted the second most important war between brothers that Chile ever had, and the country suffered due to the large number of deaths and family divisions that the war provoked. Chileans learned one great lesson: it becomes clear that the state would need to use the Army to solve a political problem. This action politicized the Army, which had thus far stayed out of politics. The perceived need to use the Army as an arbiter would be reflected again during the twentieth century when Chile would again see the military as an active participant in politics.⁵¹

During the twentieth century the Armed Forces were involved in several political interventions, especially in 1924 and 1925. Their purpose was to improve conditions for the Army and to resolve some of the serious social problems that the country experienced. This had an impact on shaping the identity discussed in previous sections, this era cemented the emerging participation of military in politics as the self-imposed and ultimate defenders of “*la patria*”.⁵² Like most of the developed world, in the 1960s Chile suffered a spiral of political violence that the politicians either failed to avoid or provoked. Some actors adopted violence as a method of political action.

⁵¹Alejandro San Francisco, *The Civil War of 1891: The Political Eruption of the Military in Chile*, (Bicentennial Study Center, Santiago, Chile, 2002).

⁵² Brian Loveman, *For La Patria – Politics and the Armed forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999).

THE PINOCHET ERA

The Coup d'état of 1973

On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military carried out a coup d'état against the government of President Salvador Allende. The military formed a government and purged society of elements that they felt were inimical to Chile. They went on to govern until 1990, when they handed power over to civilian leaders. This was the most serious event in Chilean domestic history, and the impacts of these events have still not worked their way out of the Chilean domestic political scene.

Context

In the 1970 presidential election, socialist candidate Salvador Allende received a plurality of 36percent of votes cast. In accordance with Chilean law, Congress must choose the President when no one wins outright. Traditionally the candidate with the highest number of votes was chosen, so Congress chose Allende as President. General René Schneider, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army at the time of the election and a constitutional loyalist, “reaffirmed that the Chilean Armed services, which had not attempted a coup since 1931, would refrain from doing so.”⁵³ Allende publicly assured the military that “he would respect their autonomy and the Constitution.”⁵⁴ According to Frederick Nunn, the Chilean armed forces cleaved to its constitutional mandate and had no separate ideology.⁵⁵

Discussions in the 1960s led to people and organizations reimagining Chile’s social foundations. Allende’s socialist presidential program is seen by some as the most notable example of this reimagining as he sought widespread, major societal changes. His ideas found significant opposition from across society and fervent support from a minority. Groups calling to overthrow his government and his “Marxist” way of driving the country included rightist political movements, entrepreneurial associations, some white-collar unions, as well as professional and occupational associations such as truckers, merchants, retailers, industrialist, agricultural landowners, and women’s groups.⁵⁶

Between the election in 1970 and the *golpe* in 1973, increasing political polarization created a climate of instability and tension across the country which brought the government to a standstill. The situation was significantly aggravated by chaotic economic conditions including hyperinflation and the fact that Allende only had the support of a minority in Congress, which made it difficult to resolve societal gridlock. Under pressure from fervent anti-Marxist groups and

⁵³ Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America’s Wars Vol II – the Age of the Professional Soldier, 1900-2001*, p. 319.

⁵⁴ Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 266.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 265.

⁵⁶ Brian Loveman, Military Dictatorship and Political Opposition in Chile, 1973-1986, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1986- 1987): pp. 1-38.

the political opposition accusing Allende of trying to install a totalitarian regime, the military ultimately acted by instituting a brutal coup d'état on September 11, 1973.⁵⁷

The 1990 Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (henceforth the Truth Commission) points out that Chile had a long tradition of democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law. However, in the 1960s a process of increasing political polarization led to growing intolerance and divisions among different sectors of the Chilean society. This polarization was sharply exacerbated during the Allende administration's failed socialist experiment. The 1973 coup d'état was the culmination of this process. Chileans were deeply divided about this outcome. Some considered it an inadmissible violent interruption of democratic rule; others believed it was an inevitable move to prevent an impending civil war.⁵⁸

A cogent description in 1975 of the cleavages in Chilean society by Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela noted that

the vast number of books published since (the coup) do not present one, but several-at times diametrically opposed visions of the Chilean drama...vividly reveal(ing) the sharp cleavages that characterized the Chilean polity and illustrate how difficult it would have been to prevent the collapse of Chile's institutional system. The books mirror the drama of contemporary Chilean politics with its multiplicity of truths, its rifts of perceptions, and the resulting animosities and hatred between polarized communities of true believers.⁵⁹

Although the military had declared that they would support Allende in 1970, between then and 1973, "external influences...blended with Chilean military professionalism, seem to have created a sense of mission."⁶⁰ By 1973, from the Chilean military point of view, Allende was arming the workers to take out the military. Additionally, as Collier and Sater contend, the conservative opposition signaled their disdain for the military, insulting the officer corps and casting doubts on their intelligence while the Left denounced the officers, exhorting the enlisted men to mutiny, and called for workers' militias to replace the professional armed forces.⁶¹

This, however, did not mean that all of the armed forces supported a coup. Some stayed loyal and saw themselves targets of orchestrated plans to eliminate those supporting Allende. In 1970, before President Salvador Allende took power, the aforementioned General René Schneider was assassinated at gun point in a botched kidnap attempt.⁶² In 1973 his successor, General Carlos

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 2.

⁵⁸ US Institute for Peace, *Truth Commission: Chile 90*, (Santiago, CL: National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, 1990), p. 7, <https://www.usip.org/publications/1990/05/truth-commission-chile-90>.

⁵⁹ Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Visions of Chile," *Latin American Research Review*, 1975, 10(3): 155-175, pp. 156-157.

⁶⁰ Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 265.

⁶¹ Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 353.

⁶² Luba Qureshi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2009).

Prats, went into exile after the coup only to suffer the same fate, killed in the streets of Buenos Aires by a bomb planted in his car.

When the military felt that they could not ignore it any farther, they performed a coup d'état and took control on September 11, 1973. Referred to as “el once” (the 11th) for years, many in the Chilean military now refer to it as “the first 9/11.” Chileans hold different views of the events and the aftermath of the *golpe*.⁶³

Arturo and Samuel Valenzuela identified four main political groups: the maximalist left, the gradualist left, the center, and the Right. Each had their own point of view:

The basic concern of the Left is to explain why the construction of a Socialist society, with a radical redistribution of power and wealth, was not possible in Chile. The Center, by contrast, is more concerned with explaining why Chile's vaunted democratic institutions, which made of Chile a model in Latin America, crumbled. In turn, the Right seeks to explain how it is that a nation, proud of its national and military traditions, came to be threatened from within by an alien movement and ideology.⁶⁴

Outcome

Despite the military coups early in the twentieth century, the armed forces had mainly steered away from hands-on statecraft. The 1973 *golpe* changed their approach, with far-reaching political consequences for Chileans. The armed forces under general Pinochet conceptualized their approach as a new military-political mission: to reshape and restructure Chile's society. The 17-year period of military government (1973-1990), regardless of ones' political perspective, brought order and democratic stability together with a developing economy, but also saw human rights violations committed by military personnel.

In June 1974, the government created the National Intelligence Directorate (*Directorio de Inteligencia Nacional*—DINA), bringing together intelligence personnel from across the armed forces. Three days later they issued the Statute of Governmental Junta which made Army General Augusto Pinochet their leader with no time limit and without the possibility of recall.⁶⁵

These two legal and organizational changes allowed the military government to purge elements of society. The Truth Commission⁶⁶ identified 3,428 cases of disappearance, killing, torture, and kidnapping. Moreover, most of the forced disappearances committed by the government took place between 1974 and August 1977 as a planned and coordinated strategy of the government, and that

⁶³ Final declaration of the Bureau of Dialogue, installed in August 99 to address the problem of human rights violations. HH. Chile.

⁶⁴ “Libraries and Archives,” *Latin American Research Review*, (1968), p. 157.

⁶⁵ Hugh M. Hamill, *Caudillos – Dictators in Spanish America*, (University of Oklahoma Press 1992), p. 328-329.

⁶⁶ United States Institute of Peace, *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-Report/Chile90-Report.pdf.

DINA was responsible for a significant amount of political repression during this period.⁶⁷ With most of the opposition neutralized, and due to “very strong national and international political pressure,” the government dissolved DINA in August 1977.⁶⁸ They followed up with an amnesty law decreed 1978, and a new constitution in 1981. The amnesty had the effect that all human rights violations but one⁶⁹ committed prior to the date of that decree would not be prosecuted.⁷⁰

The Constitution, approved by a “managed plebiscite” in 1980,⁷¹ secured the position of the Chilean military in the short term and played a major role in the transition back to civilian rule. This Constitution, although amended, continues as a point of contention for those Chileans who reject the legacy of military rule.

In Chile and abroad, political killings, “disappearances,” and torture came to be considered as the worst abuses of the military regime. It certainly committed many other human rights violations, including massive arbitrary imprisonment and exile as well as attacks on other civil liberties.⁷²

Less divisive (but still rankling) were the economic policies of the Pinochet era. The economic system was created and developed by pro-neoliberal civilians who were known as “The Chicago Boys,” a group of Chilean economists who studied at the University of Chicago and redesigned the Chilean economy. This was a very pure form of capitalism that, depending on one’s point of view, made Chile a star economic performer or a system that left behind segments of society and increased inequality. This is still a point of contention 30 years after the end of the Pinochet regime.

After the return to civilian rule, Chile promulgated four commissions: a truth commission, one for reparation to the victims, and two commissions on torture. The Valech Commission is the official truth and justice commission investigating gross human rights violations during the dictatorship. It produced the initial “Truth Commission” report in 1991 and a second iteration a decade later in 2011 an expanded remit. The numbers tend to differ only slightly since new statistics were released, as novel innovations to transitional justice policy were taken in consideration when reviewing judicial cases. This discussion continued in light of Chile’s evolving political and socio-legal dynamics happening at the time, including pressure coming from civil society, reforms to the

⁶⁷ United States Institute of Peace, *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-Report/Chile90-Report.pdf.

⁶⁸ Hugh M. Hamill, *Caudillos – Dictators in Spanish America* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), p. 328-329.

⁶⁹ The assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington DC in 1976

⁷⁰ U.S. Institute for Peace, *Truth Commission: Chile 90*, (National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, 1990), p. 9. <https://www.usip.org/publications/1990/05/truth-commission-chile-90>.

⁷¹ Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr Eds, *The Politics of Antipolitics – The Military in Latin America*, (Wilmington DE, Scholarly Resources, 1997), p. 269.

⁷² United States Institute of Peace, *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-Report/Chile90-Report.pdf, p. 7.

judicial branch, and an overall revamped approach to transitional justice.⁷³ The 2011 version updated the data, finding that 3,216 persons had disappeared or been assassinated while 38,254 persons survived political prison and/or torture.⁷⁴

For the Chilean military identity, the end of military rule identified three essential aspects: the need to preserve the apolitical nature of the armed forces; the consecration of their functions and missions based on the Constitution of the Republic; and the indoctrination of respect for human rights and international humanitarian law at every level of military education. Certainly, the shadow of this iron-fist approach still haunts the military and those around them in the 21st Century.

THE END OF MILITARY RULE

The Constitution promulgated in 1981 contained a requirement for a plebiscite; in late 1988, General/President Augusto Pinochet held the plebiscite and the Chilean people voted to return to civilian leadership. The military respected the plebiscite and turned over power after an election. Unlike militaries in other countries who left power in a position of significant weakness, the Chilean military left power from a position of strength and substantive corporate privileges, leaving behind a civilian government and an emerging economy. As part of the transition, the military ensured that they would not be prosecuted for events in the wake of the *golpe* through both the amnesty law and restrictions in the Constitution. As the Truth Commission said:

The armed forces considered the amnesty and its effects as a settled affair and were most worried about the prospect of widespread prosecutions. They were convinced that in 1973 they had been the last institutional bastion which managed to save the country from drifting into communism. Their argument was that prosecutions would undermine their position, dangerously depriving the country from the safeguard they represented in case of a new drift towards socialism which could never be ruled out. Further, they felt they had, in an orderly fashion, returned an economically dynamic Chile to democratic rule and that any undesirable costs paled in significance. Thinly veiled warnings that the armed forces would not tolerate a repeal of the amnesty decree were repeatedly made before and after President Aylwin was inaugurated.⁷⁵

This is an excellent example of Chilean societal cleavages that have still not disappeared. Individuals and groups who ruled at the time have not been able to regain trust across political circles, especially from those who suffered the most during the dictatorship (i.e., left-wing political and societal groups and victims of exile, torture, violence, and the families of those assassinated).

⁷³ Cath Collins, “Truth-Justice-Reparations Interaction Effects in Transitional Justice Practice: The Case of the ‘Valech Commission’ in Chile,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 2017, 49(1): pp. 55-82

⁷⁴ Observatorio Derechos Humanos, “Análisis inicial del segundo Informe Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura – ‘VALECH II,’” *UDP Universidad Diego Portales*, 2011,

<http://derechoshumanos.udp.cl/derechoshumanos/index.php/observatorio/publicaciones/func-startdown/367/>

⁷⁵ U.S. Institute for Peace, *Truth Commission: Chile 90* (Santiago, CL: National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, 1990), pp. 9-10, <https://www.usip.org/publications/1990/05/truth-commission-chile-90>.

According to Brian Loveman, there were both staunch supporters and intense opponents to the military government and each group suffered from internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements.⁷⁶ Opposition to all means of *Pinochetismo*—which included specific individual policies, his personal presence, the 1980 constitution, adoption of a fervent form of capitalism, privatization of many resources, and other dictatorship-related events—are still topics that cause hot-blooded societal and political confrontation.

Governments since the transition to democracy have been engaged in reforming Chile's constitution. Important changes have included: allowing for the direct election of municipal councilors; Supreme Court and criminal justice reform, and the enshrining of gender equality. The 2005 amendments are considered to be the greatest steps toward democracy in Chile, reducing the presidential term from six to four years, reducing military influence in politics—by transforming the National Security Council into an advisory body to the President, eliminating appointed senatorial seats, and granting the President the power to dismiss the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and the national police—and removing the current electoral system from the constitution in order to open the process to future reforms.⁷⁷

The military has also sought to put the era behind them. In 2004, the Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army Forces also declared in a speech entitled “Army of Chile – the end of a vision” that torture was unethical and that they should not have participated in these activities.⁷⁸

Overall, the Pinochet Era is the most important event in Chilean modern history. The military not only intervened in politics but also stayed to govern the country. The techniques that they used to solidify their rule between 1973 and 1977 shocked many. These together with decisions they made during their rule still resound throughout Chilean society and still divide the population.

DOMINANT RULES AND VALUES IN THE ARMED FORCES

In the Chilean armed forces, the values and virtues of each institution are codified in the respective institutional ordinances as well as the disciplinary regulations for the armed forces. Ordinances define a set of characteristic and distinctive features of the military profession. These ordinances define the ultimate goal in the vocational environment of the military profession and says that defense institutions must have people who efficiently develop their own functions and achieve their full spiritual and material development. For the Chilean military, their vocation implies an eagerness for service, an overall spirit of renunciation weakness and temptation and the acceptance

⁷⁶Brian E. Loveman, “Military Government in Latin America, 1959–1990,” *Oxford Bibliographies*, 2014, Accessed September 19, 2019.

⁷⁷IDEA, “Constitutional history of Chile. Constitutional developments: 1989-2014,” *ConstitutionNet*, <http://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-chile>.

⁷⁸General Juan Emilio Cheyre, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, “The Army and the End of a Vision,” *Daily La Tercera*, Nov 2004, http://www.archivochile.com/Derechos_humanos/com_valech/gob_otros_estado/hhddgobotros0018.pdf

of sacrifice. The appeal of military life lies in the dedication that this entails by putting yourself at the service of society through the mission of educating citizens as soldiers, training them and then leading them in the units responsible for maintaining peace or, ultimately, defending the motherland in the event of war.

Each of the armed institutions identifies the values that they emphasize and codify them in their ordinances. The Disciplinary Regulation for the Armed Forces, in its first chapter “On Military Duties,” mentions the values and virtues of the Chilean Armed Forces. In Table 1, we summarize the corresponding values enunciated by the Chilean armed forces.

Table 1: Values in the Chilean Armed Forces⁷⁹

Virtue	Army	Navy	Air Force
Loyalty	X	X	X
Honor	X	X	X
Fulfillment of duty	X	X	X
Patriotism		X	
Value	X	X	
Selflessness	X	X	
Spirit of Body	X	X	
Subordination		X	
Discipline	X	X	
Enthusiasm		X	
Initiative		X	
Military Spirit		X	
Religious Spirit		X	
Cooperation		X	
Integrity	X		
Respect	X		
Spirit of Service	X		
Subordination to law	X		

One major change in the codified regulation was that the armed forces have must take the important step towards the implementation of joint doctrine and joint operations. This begs the question of whether the characteristics and complexity of joint warfare and existence of the increasingly complex future ethical challenges will require a “Joint Code” for the Chilean Armed Forces. As shown above, the units within the armed forces have different perspectives on professionalization and values. Although the integration of armed forces as part of joint operations is sometimes

⁷⁹ Julio Soto, “The Ethics of Military in Times of Change” in *The Ethics of the Soldier in the 21st Century*, ANEPE, 2014, p. 101.

difficult, forcing some form of joint values onto the armed forces themselves could end up creating a modicum of friction within the armed forces themselves.

THE MILITARY, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIETY

During much of the twentieth century, many Latin American countries experienced a tumultuous relationship between armed forces, democratic governments, and their citizenry. A myriad of authoritarian views pushed back on what it is understood today as a representative democracy (e.g., liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, etcetera). Many different groups took power intermittently, including the militaries, *caudillos*, rebels, despots, and autocrats. When in power, the military usually blamed traditional politicians for recurrent crises of governing, demagoguery, and for bringing shame and disaster upon their nations. As we have mentioned, during much of the century, they saw themselves as the defenders of *la Patria*.⁸⁰

By the mid-1980s, electoral democracy in Latin America was bouncing back (see Figure 1).⁸¹ By then, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil had begun re-democratization processes after cruel and bloody military dictatorships. The type and style of the transitions set relations between the military, the political elite, and the citizenry. Around the late 1960s the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) military dimension index demonstrates that this was the longest time period that men in uniform determined politics across the region.⁸² This period was characterized by governments heavily based on the threat or actual use of military force who came to power via a coup, rebellion, or the dismissal of a government.⁸³ The same time period coincides with substantial political and societal demobilization and the lowest values of indicators of freedom of expression: respect for media freedom, freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, and the freedom of academic and cultural expression.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Brian Loveman, "For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America," *Wilmington: Scholarly Resources*, 1999.


⁸¹ The extent of whether electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved is measured in a scale interval, from low to high (0-1). See Michael Coppedge *et al.*, 2019. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9", Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19>, Accessed September 19, 2019.

⁸² The extent of military appointing or dismissing the chief executive based on the threat or actual use of military forces is measured in a scale interval, from low (0) to high (1).

⁸³ Michael Coppedge *et al.*, "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9," Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019 <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19>, Accessed September 19, 2019.

⁸⁴ The extent of freedom of expression is measured in a in a scale interval, from low (0) to high (1).

Figure 1. V-Dem indicators for Latin America.⁸⁵



In the case of Chile (see Figure 2), the most notable decline in civil-military relations in history happened during the Pinochet dictatorship. The extent of armed forces intrusion in society reached a peak not seen since the coups of the mid-1920s which brought interim military juntas up until the early 1930s.

What is also striking about the 1960s is that despite low—albeit upward trending—levels of electoral democracy, freedom of expression began to increase. In 1949, Chilean women received the right to vote and became active participants in politics. Life expectancy was relatively low at 57 years, as compared to neighboring Argentina where life expectancy was 65 years.⁸⁶ Demands for more equal economic and development opportunities bloomed during the 1960s and society found like-minded people in unions, associations, and other civil society groups. Party politics and politics in general dominated daily life in Chile while the population lived these political ideals to their fullest.⁸⁷ Governments introduced more pronounced social, housing, health, educational, and agrarian reforms, threatening the status quo formerly held hostage by the economic and political elite. The armed forces had seen an influx of resources post-WWII with the growing tension of the Cold War. In 1954, former general turned President Carlos Ibanez del Campo introduced the Copper Law which guaranteed that the military would receive a portion of the national copper


⁸⁵ Coppedge et al., “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9,” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019 <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19>, Accessed September 19, 2019.

⁸⁶ World Bank, *Data Bank*, Accessed September 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org>.

⁸⁷ Patricio Silva, “Doing Politics in a Depoliticised Society: Social Change and Political Deactivation in Chile,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 2004, 23(1): 63-78.

income, which stabilized the military budget. The military consisted of a professional officer corps while the other ranks were mainly conscripted and were usually middle-class young men.

Figure 2. V-Dem indicators for Chile.⁸⁸



Discussions in the 1960s led to people and organizations reimagining Chile’s social foundations. The most notable example was Salvador Allende’s (1970-1973) socialist presidential program. The reaction led to the Pinochet Era, 1973-1990. *Pinochetismo* still bonds groups together powerfully as post-authoritarian political parties, in particular the right-wing Independent Democratic Union (*Union Demócrata Independiente*—UDI).⁸⁹ Support for Pinochet-era policies continues to this day even if his personal reputation has declined. A 2015 poll found that 21 percent of participants still believed the military was right in 1973 while 66 percent who expressed said that a coup was never justifiable; at the same time support for Pinochet declined from 26 percent in 1996 to 15 percent in 2015.⁹⁰

Military and Government Expenditures

Figure 3 shows how the military in Chile has been well-resourced since before the coup. They enjoyed a funding level above the regional average before 1973. After the coup, the armed forces saw their finances increase exponentially, fluctuating between six and eight percent of the GDP

⁸⁸ Michael Coppedge et al., “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9,” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019 <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19>, Accessed September 19, 2019.

⁸⁹ James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

⁹⁰ Paula Campos, “Uno de cada cinco chilenos sigue apoyando a la dictadura”, *DiarioUChile*, August 2015, <https://radio.uchile.cl/2015/08/05/uno-de-cada-cinco-chilenos-sigue-apoyando-a-la-dictadura/>.

until the late 1980s.⁹¹ Since democratization, civilian authorities have managed to decrease military expenditures below two percent as measured as a proportion of GDP; indeed that level has been maintained partly due to the Copper Law which guaranteed the military a portion of national copper income.

Figure 3. Military expenditure, percentage of GDP.⁹²




Figure 4 paints another picture when military expenditure is measured as a percentage of general government expenditures. Chile spends a higher percentage than other countries in the region; despite the democratizers' efforts to control armed forces spending, it remains an outlier in the region. A comparison between Argentina and Brazil is useful in this case. For the former, we see a downward trend that is partly explained by the fact that civilian authorities have ignored the military and kept the armed forces' budgets to a minimum since the return to democracy, rendering some of its institutional weaponry unusable and spending most of its resources in personnel salaries.⁹³ In Brazil, the post-dictatorial governments have reconceptualized the role of their armed forces as part of their national goal of generating greater regional and world "soft power" influence and has given them between four and five percent of government expenditure over the last 25 years to support both conventional and non-conventional means of warfare.⁹⁴

Chile, on the other hand, kept the Copper Law well after the democratic transition. This benefited the armed forces and the defense industrial system, providing resources to buy F-16 jets, Leopard

⁹¹ Military expenditure is taken from the World Bank Data aggregator which uses yearly data from the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI).

⁹² Authors' construction, World Bank (2019).


⁹³ Frank O. Mora, Brian Fonseca, and Pablo Atencio, "Argentine Military Culture, 2017".

<https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/policy-innovation/military-culture-series/frank-mora-brian-fonseca-and-pablo-atencio-2017-argentine-military-culture.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Luis Bitencourt, *Brazilian military Culture, 2018* <https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/policy-innovation/military-culture-series/brazilian-military-culture-by-luis-bitencourt.pdf>.

tanks, other cutting-edge weaponry and co-financing a 13-year peacekeeping mission to Haiti. After decades of deliberation, nevertheless, the government of Sebastián Piñera, elected in 2018, announced the termination of the Copper Law, replacing it with a new financing mechanism that is derived based on mid- to long-term defense planning. The key idea here is that the state will put money in a Multiannual Strategic Capabilities Fund (*Fondo Plurianual de Capacidades Estratégicas*) and a Strategic Contingency Fund (*Fondo de Contingencia Estratégico*) that supports the governments’ national defense policy, looking at least eight years into the future with four-year investment planning. Each year, the government will publicize how much money is going to the fund, and the ministry of defense will present an update on the investments in the mid-term. This will include all related resources in the defense in including salaries, pensions, research and development and education.

Figure 4. Military expenditure, percentage of general government expenditures.⁹⁵




Another sign of the enlarged corporate advantages enjoyed by the armed forces has been the large percentage of military personnel in contrast to the national labor force. Figure 5 shows the armed forces personnel (active-duty military) in relation to the economically active population. Chile has a smaller population than Argentina and Brazil, but it has more people on active duty than either of the other countries.

Starting in 1995, spending in the military rose steeply, even though the region was relatively peaceful (except for the Peru-Ecuador war) and was generally marked by poverty, inequality, and crime. Countries in the region, including Chile, dedicated a larger share of the state’s purse in areas of critical need, such as health, housing, pensions, and schooling. Health and education spending in Chile in 2017 were 8.98 and 5.4 percent of GDP, respectively.

⁹⁵ Authors’ construction, World Bank (2019).

Figure 5. Armed forces personnel, percentage of total labor force⁹⁶



Society and Support for the Armed Forces

The military in Chile is very popular compared to other political institutions. The 2016 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Americas Barometer survey indicated that among those surveyed, the armed forces scored higher than the national legislature, police, political parties, the executive, local government, and media (see Figure 6).⁹⁷ The issue of the military's popularity across the population is an important one in many third-wave democracies such as South Africa, Indonesia, Tunisia, and South Korea.⁹⁸ The key puzzle is why former authoritarian armies enjoy such a high degree of public trust while societal trust in civilian institutions remains relatively low. This occurs despite the military's recurrent intervention in civilian politics and unfinished transitions to full civilian control (e.g., Turkey and Egypt).⁹⁹ In a phenomenon that crosses boundaries, the military is often seen as non-politicized, professional, reliable, uncorrupt,

⁹⁶ Authors' construction, World Bank (2019).


⁹⁷ All statistical and descriptive data used through the article was downloaded from data sets made available by The Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, accessed September 19, 2019. See descriptive statistics in Annex A and B.

⁹⁸ For examples of national militaries' popularity in Latin America, see Maria Fernanda Boidi and Brian Fonseca, *Attitudes towards the National Militaries in the Americas*, <https://lacc.fiu.edu/research/publications/recent-commissioned-reports-papers-and-presentations/attitudes-towards-the-military-in-the-americas-armed-forces-society.pdf> Accessed September 19, 2019.

⁹⁹ Zeki Sarigil, Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity, *Armed Forces & Society*, 2009, 34(4): pp. 710 - 711.

and stable.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, military culture largely exalts the values of heroism and sacrifice, which might be appealing to a society.

Figure 6. Trust in political institutions in selected countries, 2016 (the values shown are the mean, where 0= not at all; and, 7 = a lot).¹⁰¹



For Chile, the issue of the military enjoying such high levels of popularity impacts civil-military relations. For example, it has encouraged the military to exert political leverage against the democratic government with a goal of preventing changes to specific corporate policies inherited from the dictatorship which may advantage the military. High levels of societal trust have also given military legitimization across society and a favorable environment in which they can become involved in politics and other day-to-day events, such as human security after natural disasters, or more recently, in their involvement in the fight against transnational organized crime.¹⁰²

The use of the military’s leverage was evident in the early political transition. In the wake of the political transition in 1990, General Pinochet remained the chief of the Army until 1998 and challenged the elected authorities constantly. In an episode branded *el boinazo* (*boina* means “beret” in English), Pinochet called for black berets (i.e., paratroopers and special forces) to take the streets of Santiago’s Army Headquarters in 1993 when an investigation against his son for misappropriation of public money was about to be reopened in the courts of justice. Pinochet justified this and other explicit challenges to civilian authority together with other high-level

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pp. 709- 727.

¹⁰¹ Authors’ construction, LAPOP (2016).


¹⁰² Carlos Solar, “Civil-military relations and human security in a post-dictatorship,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2019, 42(3-4): pp. 507-531.

generals in the Air Force and Navy to prevent civilian justice prosecuting active and retired officers for their involvement in crimes during the dictatorship.¹⁰³

Today, the military’s political maneuvering against civilian politics is at its lowest levels with rare acts of open insubordination. What continues within the ranks are sporadic displays of apologetic justification toward the military coup and the “brave soldiers who gave their lives for the country” that some think deserve appreciation, not “forgiveness.” One illustrative case was when Chilean Army Captain Miguel Krasnoff Bassa gave a speech in October 2018 at Santiago’s Escuela Militar (Military School, the equivalent of the US Military Academy) praising his father, retired Colonel Miguel Krassnoff Martchenko. The latter had been sentenced to 600 plus years for various crimes related to human rights abuses and torture that happened during the dictatorship. In this particular case, the Minister Defense ordered the dismissal of Captain Krasnoff and the Escuela Militar’s director, Colonel German Villarroel, as soon as the speech went viral.¹⁰⁴

Whether or not these events change public attitudes is entirely unresolved. Figure 7 shows a decade of public opinion toward the militaries in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The most relevant trend is Argentina’s upward scores from 2008 onward, while Brazil and Chile’s popularity has remained high over time.

Figure 7. Trust in the armed forces in selected countries (the values shown are the mean, where 0= not at all; and, 7 = a lot).¹⁰⁵



¹⁰³ For a recount of insubordination events by the military during the 1990s and 2000s, see, Carlos Solar, “Defence ministers and the politics of civil-military labour: A dialogue with Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State*” *Contemporary Politics*, 2019, 25(4): pp. 419-437; and “Chile: Defense governance and democratic consolidation,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Aurel Croissant (eds.) *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness Across Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2019), pp. 103–117.

¹⁰⁴ Catalina Batarce, “Homenaje a Krassnoff: El video inaugural del polémico acto realizado en la Escuela Militar,” <https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/homenaje-krassnoff-video-inaugural-del-polemico-acto-realizado-la-escuela-militar/369282/> Accessed September 19, 2019.

¹⁰⁵ Authors’ construction, LAPOP (2016).

Since at least the early 2010s, corruption scandals in the Chilean armed forces, particularly the Army, have not lessened their popularity in LAPOP surveys.¹⁰⁶ One reason could be the constant and highly publicized use of the armed forces during recent humanitarian crises which regularly occur in a natural disaster-prone type of country like Chile. The military are usually the first responders to many catastrophes, including earthquakes, tidal waves, flooding, and wildfires. They are also in touch with communities through their participation in other non-military missions such as cybersecurity, scientific research and development, providing security for elections, running the state's de-mining and gun-control program, and many other policies that cross over with issues that support the common good such as the fight against climate change.¹⁰⁷

In summary, the evolution of the relationship between the military, government, and society in Chile has varied over the second half of the twentieth century and the first decades of the new millennia. The key takeaway regarding the armed forces' involvement in politics and the effective control over role and mission from the civilians in charge is that progress in the military and government relationships are "consonant with democratic consolidation: one depends on the other."¹⁰⁸ Although society is against a coup based on high corruption or high criminality, which is an excellent sign, these were not the reasons for the military takeover in 1973. Instead, the military acted amid a severe political and economic crisis.

Currently, populism degrades the governing credentials of the more advanced economies; no country is immune to a democratic breakdown. Chile has protected its institutions since the return to democracy, downsizing the military's corporate privileges, reforming its ministry of defense, and changing the Copper Law and amending its defense finance mechanism. Current levels of civilian control of the Chilean military represent a positive change. Still, institutional corruption taints the uniformed services and speaks poorly of civilian oversight in Chile.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, now that the Piñera government has given permission for the armed forces to collaborate with the national police in the fight against transnational organized crime,¹¹⁰ the large amount of money

¹⁰⁶ More recently, nonetheless, some local pollster will evidence the armed forces downfall in public opinion.

¹⁰⁷ Ministerio de Defensa, "Nuevos desafíos, nuevos escenarios," January 8, 2018, <https://www.defensa.cl/temas-de-estado/nuevos-desafios-nuevos-escenarios/>.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas C. Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, "The Nexus of Control and Effectiveness," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Aurel Croissant (eds.) *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness Across Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2019), pp. 227-242, 229.

¹⁰⁹ Roberto Simon, "The Enduring Myth of the 'Non-Corrupt' Military," *Americas Quarterly*, December 2019, <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/military-corruption-myth>.

¹¹⁰ The armed forces contribution to the policing bodies in the fight against organized crime happens mainly in the neighbouring zones to Peru and Bolivia in the porous Atacama Desert where major drug trafficking routes are concentrated. The military is said to contribute mostly material means, including aerial manned and non-manned vehicles, radars, logistics, and transport. See Gobierno de Chile, "Presidente Piñera visita la frontera norte para reforzar lucha contra el narcotráfico y el crimen organizado: "El apoyo de las Fuerzas Armadas fortalece la capacidad de proteger nuestras fronteras", August 15, 2019, <https://prensa.presidencia.cl/comunicado.aspx?id=100239>.

involved will provide more temptation in the ranks to participate in corruption, which would mirror the ill fate of their military and police counterparts in the region's most troubled hot spots.¹¹¹

EVENTS OF 2019

In 2019, Chile saw an unexpected social protest of great magnitude that created widespread manifestations of violence that are very destructive together with massive peaceful demonstrations. These gave life to new political, social, and economic demands. The government responded by decreeing a State of Emergency. As part of that Emergency, the Chiefs of the Armed Forces were appointed throughout the country in charge of order and security in different regions.

Although this is legal and has been used before in the case of natural disasters, some felt that the use of the Armed Forces was inappropriate as there was no military solution to social conflict with violent manifestations. The military cannot use their normal tools (the weapons of war) in order to avoid damage; additionally, this would add a new element of direct violence which could escalate the situation. What was remarkable about these events was that the military commanders always took these aspects into account and acted with extreme caution as a stabilizing force. The twenty-first century Chilean Army in particular sees themselves as a part of the Chilean people, and therefore refused to consider the public in the streets as an enemy.

Across Latin America, the military has recently (often reluctantly) returned to the forefront of politics, usually called by leaders facing major societal crises.¹¹² Recent generalized discontent in Santiago was triggered by a rise in metro fares that quickly escalated across the country into a national demand for justice and solidarity in light of an abusive neoliberal economic model, inequality, poor quality public services, and a generalized feeling against the way the country was run.¹¹³ The Piñera government imposed a curfew to stop serious arson and looting incidents following a massive wave of social protests that left at least 19 people killed. He deployed the Chilean armed forces into the streets of Santiago and other cities in the country. The military took the streets wearing full combat armor and carrying weapons. The move caught many by surprise and reminded people of scenes not seen since the military dictatorship. Many Chileans challenged the state of emergency and the curfew by staying in the streets in spite of the use of helicopters, light tanks, and the rapid deployment of over 8,000 soldiers.

In a televised message that shocked the nation, President Piñera infamously claimed that the country was “at war against a powerful enemy.” Army General Javier Iturriaga, the former commander of the Chilean Army's Special Operations, Chilean Defense Attaché in Brazil, and

¹¹¹ See for instance, Orlando J. Perez and Randy Pestana, “Honduran Military Doctrine, 2016”, <https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/policy-innovation/military-culture-series/orlando-j-perez-and-randy-pestana-2016-honduran-military-culture.pdf>.

¹¹² Max Fisher, “‘A Very Dangerous Game’: In Latin America, Embattled Leaders Lean on Generals.” *The New York Times*, November 1, 2019. Section A, p. 13.

¹¹³ *The Economist*, “Piñera's Pickle”. Vol. 433, Issue 9167, (Nov 2, 2019): pp. 43-44.

Chief of Operations for the Chilean Army, and currently the commander of the Chilean Army Education and Doctrine Command, was named at the *Comandancia en Jefe de la Guarnición Región Metropolitana* as the Commander in Chief of the Metropolitan Region Garrison (the equivalent of the commander of Joint Task Force-National Capitol Region [JTF-NCR] in the United States) during the nine days of the state of emergency; he reported directly to the Minister of Defense, Alberto Espina. Reporters asked him the second day if he shared the president's assessment of the events. General Iturriaga showed a more reflective posture and declared that he "was not at war with anyone" which lowered tension and opened the possibilities for greater political dialogue later allowing for the gradual elimination of curfews.¹¹⁴

Soon after, President Piñera's approval rating dropped from 29 percent to 14 percent, an all-time low for a president in the democratic era. The iron-fist response of the state through both policing bodies (the *Carabineros de Chile* and the *Policía de Investigaciones de Chile*—PDI), and the military, marked a turning point in the human rights situation. According to the National Human Rights Institute (INDH), over 11,000 civilians were injured in the first seven weeks of the protests. Of that number, 1,980 were injured by firearms, mostly by rubber bullets causing severe eye and face trauma. Another 1,940 were hit by tear gas canisters or reported fractures, injuries, and wounds caused by the police or the military.¹¹⁵

The militarization of the episode was unforeseen and unpredicted. Reports indicate that the military spent \$44 million pesos (almost US\$60,000) in an express purchase of non-lethal ammunition two days after the unrest began. As of April 2020, the Ministry of Defense was expecting a full report by the armed forces regarding their eventful deployment. So far, minister Espina had declared his total support to the armed forces, saying General Iturriaga had fulfilled his duty as a soldier in returning "normality" to the country. "In that he delivered. I told him so and congratulated him," Espina added.¹¹⁶ A survey poll conducted following the protests placed the police and the military as the third "most willing" political institutions in recognizing the roots of the conflict and its demands, rated higher than the president and lawmakers, and below the INDH and municipal mayors. The same survey rated the armed forces' approval higher than the president, ministers, lawmakers, and political parties.¹¹⁷

This series of incidents is a manifestation of the societal cleavages left over from the 1970-1990 period of Allende and Pinochet. The Chilean armed forces will continue to have a bad reputation among a minority of Chileans due to the events described in detail in the Pinochet Era section.

¹¹⁴ See more details in Sebastián Palma and Sebastián Labrín, "El regreso del general Iturriaga a los cuarteles". Available at <https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/regreso-del-general-iturriaga-los-cuarteles/886130/> (Accessed November 3, 2019).

¹¹⁵ Instituto Nacional Derechos Humanos (INDH) "Informe Anual Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Chile 2019." Available at <https://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/bitstream/handle/123456789/1701/Informepercent20Final-2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

¹¹⁶ Palma and Labrín, "El regreso del general Iturriaga a los cuarteles," *La Tercera*, 2019, <https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/regreso-del-general-iturriaga-los-cuarteles/886130/>.

¹¹⁷ Núcleo Milenio en Desarrollo Social, "Termómetro Social," *DESOC*, Octubre 2019, https://b6323ffa-7fb7-4415-b07a-a0afa49c7f3f.filesusr.com/ugd/a52fe7_2da7b8055e3d4c5786ec58984500c247.pdf?index=true.

This is in spite of the fact that no one is left in the armed forces that served in the years between 1973 and 1977, and that only the very senior people were serving during the transition in 1990.

CONCLUSION

The Chilean armed forces have enjoyed a great deal of success and thus popularity in their history. Their initial problems facing off against Spain and indigenous groups together with their geostrategic situation gave them impetus to professionalize. They sought to emulate successful militaries, starting with the French, later the Prussians, and eventually the United States military.

They were able to choose which attributes of those militaries that they respected and fused them to their unique civil-military situation. This has led to Chile having a very stable and political history vis-à-vis their neighbors. Internal frictions exacerbated by the Cold War and the widespread adoption of violence in politics in the 1960s caused an executive-military standoff that ended in a coup d'état in 1973.

After harsh tactics between 1973 and 1977 and a restructuring of the Chilean economy and politics, the military voluntarily gave up rule in 1990 and passed Chile to civilian leaders, returning to the barracks and focusing predominantly on external threats. Unfortunately, the results of the 17 years of military rule have not all manifested yet.

THE FUTURE

The Chilean military is entering an era of strategic redefinitions to transform its old Cold War territorial defense model to one defined by the priorities of civilian governments favoring human security roles and missions more in tune with the newly perceived threats to national security in the region.¹¹⁸ Military culture, doctrine, rationales, and force structure should therefore equate with novel policy initiatives and the ensuing relationships with the rest of government and society. These challenges include how to resolve effectiveness to traditional and non-traditional duties ranging from environmental protection and cyber defense, to scientific and medical services, while increasing women's participation in the armed forces.¹¹⁹ More executive control over budget allocations should enter into force as the Copper Law fades away into the new finance mechanism announced, promising more oversight from key stakeholders in the state's affairs diminishing corporate autonomies in the services branches. Finally, and in light of recent social protests in the rest of the region, the armed forces in Chile should consider in retrospective how to remain strictly aligned to the path of democratic governance, equally committed to the utmost respect for human rights and peaceful development entering the first half of the century.

¹¹⁸ Carlos Solar, "Civil-Military Relations and Human Security in a Post-Dictatorship," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2019, 42 (3-4): p. 507-531.

¹¹⁹ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "Chapter Eight: Latin America and the Caribbean," *The Military Balance*, 2019, <https://iiss.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2018.1561034#.XpXzGfZFPY>.

Annex A. Descriptive statistics “Trust in the Armed Force” (source: LAPOP data sets from 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016).

Argentina					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
2006/7	-	-	-	-	-
2008	1384	1	7	3.17	1.74
2010	1330	1	7	3.29	1.87
2012	1446	1	7	4.09	1.91
2014	1433	1	7	4.24	1.92
2016	1467	1	7	4.53	2.01

Brazil					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
2006/7	1199	-	-	4.95	1.86
2008	1443	1	7	5.10	1.74
2010	2417	1	7	5.20	1.75
2012	1480	1	7	5.13	1.74
2014	1490	1	7	4.76	1.93
2016	1523	1	7	5.19	1.86

Chile					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
2006/7	1496	-	-	4.89	1.76
2008	1490	1	7	4.91	1.7
2010	1935	1	7	5.31	1.5
2012	1473	1	7	4.81	1.58
2014	1520	1	7	4.62	1.72
2016	1599	1	7	4.86	1.83

Annex B. Descriptive statistics trust in political institutions (source: LAPOP 2016).

Argentina					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Armed forces	1467	1	7	4.53	2.01
National Legislature	1452	1	7	3.79	1.74
National Police	1510	1	7	3.56	1.87
Political Parties	1497	1	7	2.77	1.70
Executive	1509	1	7	3.38	2.10
Local government	1491	1	7	3.94	1.94
Media	1508	1	7	4.02	1.89

Brazil					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Armed forces	1523	1	7	5.19	1.86
National Legislature	1512	1	7	2.83	1.88
National Police	1527	1	7	4.06	2.01
Political Parties	1525	1	7	2.09	1.53
Executive	1522	1	7	2.33	1.79
Local government	1526	1	7	3.26	1.94
Media	1521	1	7	4.48	1.90

Chile					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Armed forces	1599	1	7	4.86	1.83
National Legislature	1576	1	7	2.92	1.64
National Police	1620	1	7	4.38	1.84
Political Parties	1580	1	7	2.21	1.41
Executive	1607	1	7	3.63	1.95
Local government	1607	1	7	4.32	1.76
Media	1616	1	7	4.14	1.70

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